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aBstraCt. The protection of buildings against fire disasters may require a comparison of 
alternative fire safety designs. The fire safety solutions can be compared by means of a general 
methodology known as multi-attribute selection or multi-criteria decision making. the alter-
native fire designs can be described by a number of attributes which characterise each of the 
alternatives. fire risk expressed in the general form used for the quantitative risk assessment 
is applied to compose the set of attributes of a multi-attribute selection problem. it is shown 
how to accomplish the multi-attribute selection in the presence of epistemic uncertainties in 
the elements of fire risk estimate. Epistemic probability distributions assigned to elements of 
fire risk are specified and propagated though models of the multi-attribute selection by means 
of Monte carlo simulation. an example presented in the paper considers the choice among 
alternative systems of automatic fire sprinklers.
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1. iNtroDuCtioN
It is needless to say that fire is the main 
physical hazard threatening life and property in 
non-industrial and many industrial buildings. 
although some buildings involve the potential-
ity of other disastrous accidents, for instance, 
explosions of domestic gas, failure of struc-
tural and mechanical components (e.g., due 
to earthquake actions or component faults in 
elevators) or stampedes during a crown panic, 
fire remains the dominating cause of disas-
ters in buildings. fire in an individual build-
ing is a low-probability event; however, fires 
occur frequently and destroy life and property 
in a population of buildings in any country. a 
review of general statistics on fire damage in 
different countries is provided, among others, 
by ramachandran (1998) and yung (2008).
fires in non-industrial buildings exhibit 
the same feature as many industrial accidents 
if we look at their consequences. A fire with 
minor, limited consequences is much more 
likely to happen in a particular building than 
a major fire disaster. A common feature in a 
number of disasters in buildings is a sudden 
spread of fire from apparently small fire to one 
which is highly threatening and disastrous.
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A review of fire disasters in public and office 
buildings is provided by rasbash et al. (2004). 
Craighead (2009) describes major fires in high-
rise office buildings. Taking a look at these 
accidents allows to notice that a major fire is 
an uncertain and complex phenomenon influ-
enced by many random processes and factors 
and capable to happen under various scenarios 
with different consequences. this turns build-
ing fires to an ideal subject of quantitative risk 
assessment (qra) (yung, 2008; hasofer et al., 
2007; Meacham, 2002; Hoła, 2006, 2007, 2009, 
2010). However, the management of fire risk 
on the basis of qra results remains an excep-
tion in dwellings, offices and public buildings. 
in europe, qra and qra-based managerial 
decisions are mandatory only in nuclear power 
plants and industrial facilities regulated by 
the seveso ii directive (e.g., kirchsteiger et al., 
1998). In the US, the national fire protection 
organisations produced guidelines for fire risk 
assessment; however, the assessment itself is 
not mandatory practice in this country, to the 
best of our knowledge (sfpe, 2006; nfpa, 
2009).
the present paper considers how to apply 
the results of fire risk estimation by means of 
QRA to a decision-making in the field of fire 
safety. the main idea is to incorporate results 
of qra into the framework of the formal de-
cision-making methodology known as multi-
attribute selection (Mas) or multi-criteria de-
cision making (McdM). it is shown that Mas 
will allow to compare alternative fire safety 
design by taking into account the fire risk as-
sociated with each of them.
2. MethoDologiCal BaCKgrouND
2.1. performance-based fire codes and 
fire risk
although an application of qra is possi-
ble, at least in principle, on the low level of 
decision-making (by building owners, insurers, 
manufacturers and constructors installing fire 
protection systems), the prevailing approaches 
to fire safety design is conforming to building 
regulations known as prescriptive fire codes 
and performance-based fire codes.
The practice of fire safety designs is chang-
ing from following traditional prescriptive de-
sign codes to more flexible performance-based 
codes (e.g., Natorianni, 2002). The fire designs 
in line with these two types of codes can be 
viewed as two principal attitudes to an appli-
cation of risk assessment for fire safety provi-
sion.
the prescriptive codes are still widely used 
in many countries, including the authors’ coun-
try lithuania. the prescriptive design require-
ments generally relate to the provision of com-
partments with prescribed levels of fire resist-
ance, the selection of building materials, the 
provision of escape facilities. the prescriptive 
requirements do not take sufficient account of 
the effectiveness of active fire protection meas-
ures such as sprinklers, ventilation systems 
and fire alarms. Prescriptive requirements, if 
enforced rigidly, can lead to costly over-design, 
particularly for some large and complex build-
ings (ramachandran, 1998). the prescriptive 
design approach has been criticised by many 
publications for inability to provide the most 
cost-effective design solutions, to maintain a 
consistent level of fire safety in buildings, and, 
in general, for restricting innovation (hasofer 
et al., 2007).
the performance-based codes allow flex-
ibility in fire safety designs as long as the 
designs can provide the required level of fire 
safety to the occupants. the major objective 
of the performance-based design is to achieve 
satisfactory level of fire safety to the occupants 
and fire brigade personnel. Levels of fire safe-
ty (or, alternatively, fire risk) are assessed by 
applying risk assessment, either qualitative 
or quantitative (guanquan and Jinhua, 2008; 
yung, 2008; hasofer et al., 2007). the latter 
is widely denoted by the acronym qra intro-
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duced above. in other words, the performance-
based approach is a risk-based one.
2.2. optimisation tasks in fire safety 
design
The aim of performance-based fire design is, 
in essence, an optimisation task: to achieve the 
required level of fire safety (tolerable fire risk) 
by using minimum expenditures. the explicit 
use of fire risk measures opens up possibili-
ties to apply formal methods of optimisation 
to decision-making concerning fire safety. The 
specific forms of optimisation problems depend 
on the level of a decision-maker. this level can 
range from a particular property owner to a 
state government (ramachandran, 1998).
The optimisation problems related to fire-
safety design can be classified into two general 
types:
determination of an optimum level of 1. 
fire safety.
search for an optimum combination of 2. 
fire safety measures.
the determination of the optimum level of 
fire safety is expressed as a search for a fire 
protection strategy which yields the minimisa-
tion of total cost (ramachandran, 2002). this 
task is based on classical problem of total cost 
minimisation (benefit maximisation) which is 
well known in the fields of reliability and risk 
management (e.g., smith, 2005). the expres-
sion of the total cost includes the annual prob-
ability of fire occurrence; however, this problem 
is too “crude” because it doest not account for 
different fire scenarios which can end up in a 
variety consequences, direct and indirect ones.
the search for an optimum combination of 
fire safety measures can be formally expressed 
in the form of several problems of different 
generality:
a) The choice among alternative fire protec-
tion measures and their combinations 
using logical trees (e.g., a decision tree 
analysis) (e.g., donegan, 2002);
b) The search for an optimal package of fire 
protection and insurance (ramachan-
dran, 1998);
c) cost-benefit evaluation of fire safety 
measures (Brown, 2005; Butry et al., 
2007);
d) Search for a best configuration of an indi-
vidual fire safety system (e.g., Lai et al., 
2010).
the problems just listed are amenable to 
mathematical formalisation in the form of 
tasks of single- and multi-objective optimisa-
tion as well as the tasks of Mas. the distinc-
tion between the multi-objective optimisation 
and Mas can be viewed as a distinction be-
tween decision problems with continuous and 
discrete decision space (e.g., sakalauskas and 
Zavadskas 2009; Zavadskas and vaidogas, 
2009).
The assessment of fire risk by means of 
qra results in a discrete set of estimates 
(likelihood-outcome pairs). therefore, the main 
result of qra, the expression of risk, can be 
embedded into a Mas problem with relative 
ease. we think that the “marriage” of qra 
and MAS can allow to make fire safety related 
decisions which implements the goals of per-
formance-based and are based on formal tools 
of Mas.
3. Multi-attriBute seleCtioN iN 
risK-BaseD fire safety DesigN
3.1. maS problem and fire safety aspects
the Mas aims at determining the best al-
ternative a* or a subset of leading alternatives 
among a discrete set of alternatives represent-
ed by the vector a = (a1, a2, … , ai, … , am)t. 
the quality of ai is evaluated by means of a 
row-vector ci = (ci1, ci2, … , cij, … , cin), the 
components of which, cij, are attributes of ai 
(or criteria) used for Mas. in terms of Mas, 
the element cij expresses impact of the ith al-
ternative on the jth attribute.
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data for solving a Mas problem is formu-
lated as a m×n decision matrix:
t
1[ , ... , , ... , ]i m=C c c c  (1)
the values cij making up different columns 
of C are usually of different units. to facilitate 
inter-attribute comparisons, the components 
cij are normalised. a normalised (dimension-
less) decision matrix C  is obtained from C. 
the structure of C  is:
t
1[ ]i m= , ... , , ... ,C c c c  (2)
where: 1 2( , , ... , , ... , )i i i ij inc c c c=c  (i = 1, 2, … , 
m) is the row-vector calculated by normaliz-
ing components of the corresponding ci. Most 
methods of Mas select a* with the normalised 
C  and not the initial C (triantaphyllou, 2000; 
hwang and yoon, 1981). examples of nor-
malization formulas used to obtain ijc  from 
cij are given by vaidogas (2007), vaidogas and 
hayashi (2007), liu (2009), peldschus (2009), 
Urbanavičienė et al. (2009), Zavadskas et al. 
(2008).
the difference in significance of the at-
tributes cij (i = 1, 2, … , m) is expressed by the 
vector of weights, w = (w1, w2, … , wj, … , wn)t. 
usually, the weights wj are between 0 and 1 
and add up to 1. if w is applied, the search for 
a* is carried out by using the attribute values 
j ijw c . a number of formal methods are sug-
gested in the literature for specifying wj, both 
crisp and fuzzy (hwang and yoon, 1981; tri-
antaphyllou, 2000). these methods can be as 
informal as delphi method or as formal as the 
eigenvector technique of the analytical hierar-
chy process (e.g., donegan, 2002). an example 
of specifying wj used for fire related decisions 
in the edinburgh method developed for rank-
ing fire safety attributes of buildings (Watts, 
2002; rasbash et al., 2004).
the key element of each Mas method is the 
criterion, according to which ai are ranked and 
the best one, a*, is selected (Mas criterion, in 
short). in this paper, criteria of several, say, nk 
methods applied to selecting a* will be denoted 
by the letters K1, K2, … , Kk, … , knK .  the 
buoyant literature devoted to the development 
and comparison of the criteria Kk is conven-
iently reviewed by french (1988), triantaphyl-
lou (2000), figueira et al. (2005).
applications of Mas criteria Kk to real-
world problems are numerous and found in 
very different fields. In the field of fire safety, 
these criteria were applied mainly to ranking 
fire safety attributes (Rasbash et al., 2004; 
Zhao et al., 2004; Hoła and Schabowicz, 2010; 
schabowicz and hola, 2007). 
The specification of w, and the choice of Kk, 
together with the calculation of C  require to 
make subjective decisions. for instance, differ-
ent Mas methods should be chosen for different 
decision-making situations by answering sub-
jective questions (hwang and yoon, 1981). the 
subjectivity of Mas is a natural background for 
applying uncertain attributes cij. uncertainty 
distributions widely used in qra and express-
ing, in essence, a subjective degree of belief 
naturally match the subjective setting of Mas.
3.2. alternative fire designs
In context of the fire design, the alterna-
tives ai can be alternative fire safety designs:
1. To install some fire protection measure(s) 
in a building or to retain it without any 
protection;
2. to install only one specific protection 
measure or a combination of measures, 
for instance, sprinklers or automatic de-
tectors alone, or both sprinklers and de-
tectors;
3. to choose among several types of a spe-
cific safety measure, for example, among 
several sprinkler types (dry-pipe sprin-
klers, wet-pipe sprinkles, etc.);
4. to choose among several producers (im-
porters) of specific equipment used as a 
fire protection measure;
5. to choose among more complicated al-
ternatives which can include specific 
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combinations of fire protection measures 
as well as the alternative of “doing noth-
ing” (not installing any fire protection if 
this is allowed by regulations).
The alternative fire safety designs listed 
above are related to active fire protection 
measures. however, alternative solutions can 
also be generated by considering also passive 
fire protection, such as alternative compart-
mentalisation or choosing among alternative 
walls, doors, structural members.
alternative solutions of active and passive 
fire protection are amenable to a formal com-
parison within an Mas problem. economic 
attributes and attributes expressing stand-
ard technical characteristics of fire protection 
measures can be a natural part of this prob-
lem. however, the Mas problem should also 
include attributes which directly or indirectly 
express risk posed by potential fire. Fire pro-
tective measures are installed to reduce this 
risk and eventually their effectiveness should 
be measured in terms of risk reduction.
3.3. maS attributes related to fire safety
the alternative solutions of active and pas-
sive fire protection can be compared within the 
decision tree analysis, in which they are called 
“safety strategies” or “courses of action” (ras-
bash et al., 2004; donegan, 2002; ramachan-
dran, 1998). the decision tree is the appropri-
ate approach to use if the object is to identify 
the alternative ai optimising a single attribute, 
say, ci1 (e.g., the most cost effective fire protec-
tion strategy identified by searching for mini-
mum total annual cost). thus the decision tree 
analysis can be considered a special, simpli-
fied case of MAS. However, the complexity of 
fire safety evaluation problems may require to 
compare the alternatives ai by means of more 
than a single attribute ci1.
in our opinion, the attributes cij evaluat-
ing the alternatives ai can be grouped into four 
categories:
i. attributes expressing technical charac-
teristics of fire safety measures (perform-
ance, effectiveness, reliability (availabil-
ity), e.g., see the chapter 10 in rasbash 
et al. (2004) for a description of such at-
tributes).
II. Economic (monetary) attributes of fire 
protection measures (life-cycle cost or 
costs specified on a detailed level: initial 
budget cost, maintenance cost, etc.; an 
example of life-cycle costing of a fire pro-
tection measure (sprinklers) is provided 
by Brown (2005).
iii. attributes expressing different attitudes 
towards insurance against fire (e.g., see 
chapters 6 and 11 in ramachandran 
(1998) for a description of fire insur-
ance).
iv. safety-related attributes expressing in-
fluence of individual alternative design 
ai on the risk to life and property. as 
failures of fire protection measures in the 
course of fire can lead to severe escala-
tion of accident, the attribute “reliability” 
mentioned in the first group can be in-
cluded in this category.
attributes of the categories i and ii are of 
general nature and are applicable, in princi-
ple, to any building system. finding the values 
for most of the attributes belonging to these 
categories shouldn’t be a difficult exercise. The 
exception is the attribute “reliability”. an es-
timation of reliability (demand availability) of 
such systems as automatic sprinklers, fire de-
tectors, ventilation systems, smoke ventilators 
and fire doors can be a non-trivial task which 
must be solved by applying special methods of 
qra (e.g., hauptmanns et al., 2008).
the insurance-related attributes of the cat-
egory iii can be assigned, formally, to the eco-
nomic category ii as insurance premiums are 
simple monetary quantities. however, it makes 
sense to exclude them into a separate category 
because finding values of these attributes can 
be a difficult exercise, especially when MAS is 
to be applied in the early stages of the design 
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(prior to negotiations with individual insur-
ers). in addition, insurance premiums can de-
pend on the current economic situation in the 
insurance industry and only partially on the 
fire risk level of a building to be insured (see, 
e.g. Watts, 2002) for fire risk indices used by 
insurers). in addition, insurers use their own 
indices of fire risk which substantially differ 
from the indices measures prevailing among 
fire safety engineers (Watts, 2002). If neces-
sary, the insurers’ indices can be incorporated 
into an Mas problem. 
attributes of the category iv relate a spe-
cific alternative design ai to the level of fire 
safety (or, alternatively, fire risk) of the build-
ing which can be achieved by means of ai. it 
is natural to state that the effectiveness of ai 
should be measured eventually by this level.
the following two approaches to quantify-
ing fire risk of entire building are well-known 
in the field of fire safety:
fire risk indexing (e.g., rasbash et al.,  –
2004; watts, 2002);
fire risk assessment carried out in line  –
with qra (see the references given in 
introduction).
the two approaches can be viewed as 
methodological tools of the performance-based 
fire design. The difference between fire risk 
indexing and fire risk assessment resembles 
difference between traditional deterministic 
structural analysis and reliability-based one 
(Šakėnaitė and Vaidogas, 2010). 
A fire risk index, say, I(xi) fits naturally for 
a Mas attribute cij, that is, cij ≡ I(xi). Most of 
the widely-known indices are calculated with 
relative ease as functions of a relatively large 
number of building characteristics relevant to 
fire safety (components of the vector xi). the 
characteristics are called “fire safety param-
eters or attributes”, albeit the term “attribute” 
is not used in the sense of Mas (rasbash 
et al., 2004; watts and solomon, 2002; watts 
and kaplan, 2001).
Almost all fire risk indices are calculated as 
single (scalar) values and pretend to covering 
all fire consequences. The FRAME fire index 
is calculated in the form of three values, say, 
I1(xi), I2(xi) and I3(xi) which express fire risk to 
building and its content, occupants and busi-
ness activities, respectively (fraMe, 2010). 
the distinguishing between different kinds 
of fire consequences makes the FRAME index 
closer to the expression of risk used for qra. 
the fraMe index can be incorporated into 
Mas problem in the form of three separate at-
tributes, for instance, cij ≡ I1(xi), ci,j+1 ≡ I2(xi)) 
and ci,j+2 ≡ I3(xi).
Although fire risk indices I(xi) are natural 
candidates to be used as Mas attributes cij, 
their use in the framework of Mas can be prob-
lematic due to a possible insufficient sensitivity 
to the differences presented by the alternative 
designs ai. the indices may not have input 
variables (components of xi) which allow to 
distinguish between different types of fire pro-
tection measures, for instance, different types 
of sprinklers or sprinklers systems of the same 
type but with different level of reliability.
a systematic investigation of the indices 
I(xi) differences in fire safety measures ex-
pressed in our case by the alternatives ai is 
not known to us. Our finding is that the wide-
ly-known indices are either incapable or too 
rough to express subtle differences among fire 
safety measures represented by ai (Šakėnaitė 
and vaidogas, 2010).
other problems with the use of indices are 
not MAS specific ones; however, these prob-
lems may reduce attractiveness of the indices 
I(xi) to the use within Mas:
a) the indices I(xi) are fairly different sys-
tems used to quantify fire risk; it is dif-
ficult to compare results produced by dif-
ferent indices; 
b) different indices are used in different 
countries and their use seems to be a 
result of agreement between interested 
Protecting Built Property Against Fire Disasters: Multi-Attribute Decision ... 397
parties in a specific country rather than a 
result of some scientific reasoning;
c) some of the indices are applicable to 
wide range of buildings; whereas some 
are applied to highly specific buildings 
and other kind of property;
d) algorithms used to calculate the indices 
I(xi) and input information possess high 
degree subjectivity; a specification of this 
information is not well documented;
e) the indices I(xi) are generally “rigid” sys-
tems; they do not allow to take account 
of new developments in fire risk assess-
ment.
we think that the listed shortcomings of 
the fire risk indices I(xi) may limit their ap-
plication to Mas. an alternative approach to 
fire risk indexing is a fire risk assessment in 
line with qra. results of qra can be serve as 
MAS attributes related to fire safety.
4. iNCorporatiNg fire risK 
Measures iNto Mas
4.1. fire risk in decision matrix
a very comprehensive attribute of the alter-
native fire designs ai is the risk defined in line 
with qra, i.e. in the form of likelihood-out-
come pairs (yung, 2008; hasofer et al., 2007). 
in the context of this paper, the risk of ai due 
to exposure to a potential fire will consist of 
possible outcomes (consequences) iro  of this 
situation and likelihoods irl  of iro . generally, 
each iro  is represented by several measures 
of significance or, in brief, significances (Ku-
mamoto and henley, 1996). each iro  can be 
characterised by several, say, n significances of 
a different nature and with different measure-
ment units. The significances can be grouped 
into the row-vector:
sir = (sir1, sir2, ..., sirj, ..., sirn) (3)
with the values lir, oir, sir, the fire risk re-
lated to ai takes the following form:
fire risk related to ai ≡ 
{(lir, oir, sir), r = 1, 2, … , ni} (4)
the alternatives ai with different level of 
risk can be generated by comparing the fire de-
signs with different probabilities of failure (suc-
cess) given a fire. This will require to estimate 
failure probabilities of alternative automatic 
sprinkler systems and fire detection and alarm 
systems. Methods and data used for such an es-
timation are considered, among others, by hall 
(2010), hauptmanns et al. (2008), nyyssönen 
et al. (2005), rönty et al. (2004), vaidogas 
(2003, 2006). in many cases the estimation of 
the failure probabilities will be a non-trivial 
task. potential points of introduction of the 
alternative fire designs with different failure 
probabilities are shown in figure 1.
the total number of the outcomes, ni, may 
vary from alternative to alternative. the risk 
(4) may express fairly diverse information, es-
pecially when the severity of each iro  is repre-
sented by more than one significance measure. 
the vectors sir (r = 1, 2, … , ni) can be grouped 
in the ni×n matrix:
[si1, si2, ..., sir, ..., sini]
t (5)
each column of the above matrix consists 
of significances with the same measurement 
unit. with this matrix, one can calculate n-di-
mensional vector of expected significances that 
are associated with ith alternative and apply 
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in the case that the severity of each iro  is 
represented by a single significance irs  (vec-





l s  will be a scalar 
value and comparison of ai will be straightfor-
ward, provided that further attributes are not 
introduced into the Mas problem.
The expected significances in Eq. (6) con-
tain the likelihoods irl , which in many cases 
can be estimated independently of the signifi-
cances irjs  (e.g., kumamoto and henley, 1996). 
each irl  can be expressed as probability of iro  
per fire. Frequencies (numbers of occurrences 
per year) are also used as irl .
if irl  is associated with rth event tree path 






l l p , where l0 and ′bp  is 
the likelihood of an initiating event E0 and the 
probability of bth branching point represented 
by an event pair bE  and bE , respectively (e.g., 
the event tree diagram in figure 1 shows that 
′ ′ ′= 0 1 2 3irl l p p p  and nbr = 3).
4.2. the need to deal with uncertainties
the prevailing method of uncertainty quan-
tification in QRA is the classical Bayesian ap-
proach to qra (Bayesian approach). in line 
with the Bayesian approach, the uncertainty 
in parameters and input of qra models is di-
vided into aleatory (stochastic) and epistemic 
(state-of-knowledge) uncertainty (e.g., vaid-
ogas 2009; Vaidogas and Juocevičius, 2008a, 
2009; helton and oberkampf, 2004; aven and 
pörn, 1998). this division is used due to the 
sparseness of data related to qra models and 
for the convenience of modelling. the Bayesian 
approach produces estimates of risk and fail-
ure probabilities expressed in terms of epis-
temic uncertainty distributions. an incorpora-
tion of these distributions into Mas requires 
selecting a* in the presence of uncertain com-
ponents cij of C.
in the context of the Bayesian approach, 
irl  will be estimated in the form of epistemic 
uncertainty distributions related to true, al-
beit unknown values of irl . such estimations 
are usually carried out by propagating epis-
temic uncertainties through such qra models 
as event trees and fault trees (e.g., figure 3) 
(aven and pörn, 1998; vaurio and Jänkälä, 
2006; Vaidogas and Juocevičius 2007, 2008b). 
Fire-specific applications of the separate mod-
elling of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties 
were suggested in previous decades by siu and 
apostolakis (1988) and Bradyberry and apos-
tolakis (1991).








  E2, 1– p22
1
Evaculation
Fire scenario r with the likelihood lir = l0 pi1 p2 pi3




  E2, 1– pi33
E3, pi3
Comparison of alternative extinguishing systems 
with different failure probabilities pi1
Comparison of alternative evacuation possibilities with the 
different success probabilities 1 – pi3
Outcomes oir
figure 1. A fragment of an event tree diagram with the event tree path expressing the fire scenario r; the diagram shows  
also potential points of consideration of alternative fire design solutions within a QRA problem
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in the context of the Bayesian approach, l0 
and the branching probabilities ′bp  (b = 1, 2, … , 
nbr) may be uncertain in the epistemic sense. 
Such an uncertainty can be quantified by the 
respective random variables L0 and ′bp . then 
the epistemic uncertainty in the likelihoods 
irl  can be expressed by the random variable 
=
′= ∏ 0 1
brn
ir bb
L L p . with the random likelihoods 




l s  turns into the epistemic random 
variable 
=
= ∑ 1 i
n
ij ir irjr
c L s . this replacement 
yields a Mas problem with stochastic attribute 
vectors:
=    1 2( , , ... , , ... , )i i i ij inc c c cc  (7)
replacing ci in the initial deterministic de-
cision matrix C by ci  defined by either Eq. (1) 
will yield a stochastic decision matrix:
t
1[ c , ... ,c , ... ,c ]i m=C     (8)
the uncertainties expressed by elements 
of C  may not necessarily be epistemic ones. 




L s , the matrix C  may contain el-
ements that are uncertain in the aleatory 
sense.
the Mas problem formulated in the form 
of C  can be solved by applying the propaga-
tion of epistemic and, if necessary, aleatory 
uncertainties (Zavadskas and vaidogas; 2009). 
the solution will consists in sampling values 

lC  of C  by means of Monte carlo simulation 
(l = 1, 2, … , Nl). the Mas problem can be 
solved and the best alternative can be chosen 
for each  lC . the simulation will yield the fre-
quencies of the selection of individual alterna-
tives ai as the best ones in Nl trials. then the 
alternative with the highest frequency of selec-
tion can be chosen as a*.
5. appliCatioN exaMple
a sprinkler system among three alterna-
tive systems a1, a2, and a3 is to be chosen. 
the alternatives a1, a2, and a3 denote dry pipe, 
deluge and pre-action sprinklers, respectively 
(table 1). the most appropriate one, a*, will 
serve along with automatic fire detectors and 
alarm system as fire protection measure in an 
industrial building. A potential fire accident in 
this building has four possible scenarios repre-
sented by the event tree given in figure 2.
table 1. initial data used for the selection from 
alternative sprinkler systems
system fire likelihood l0 (year–1)
all systems
a1, a2, a3
L0 ~ g(3, 20) (a gamma distribution 
with the mode of 0,10)
alarm failure probability pf1
all systems
a1, a2, a3
1p  ~ Be(4, 58) with the mode of 0,05
sprinkler failure probability pfi2
dry pipe a1 12p  ~ Be(4; 55) (beta distribution)
deluge a2 22p  ~ Be(4; 60)
pre-action a3 32p  ~ Be(3; 30)
Mode of the distribution of pfi2
dry pipe a1 0.0526
deluge a2 0.0484
pre-action a3 0.0645
cost ci5 of ai (€mln)
dry pipe a1 c15 = 0.30
deluge a2 c25 = 0.24
pre-action a3 c35 = 0.27
the structure of the event tree diagram is 
identical for all three sprinkler systems a1, a2, 
and a3. The fire risk related to the sprinklered 
building is given by:
riski ≡ { ( , , )ir ir irl o s , r = 1, 2, 3, 4} (9)
where: the index i refers to the alternative ai 
(i = 1, 2, 3); irl  is the likelihood of the scenario 
r with the outcome oir in the building with 
sprinklers ai; and irs  is the vector of signifi-
cances of oir.
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as shown in figure 2, the vectors sir  are 
expressed as sir = (sir1, sir2, sir3, sir4), where 
sir1 is the property loss due to fire and/or fire 
suppression (€th.); sir2 is the number of possi-
ble deaths among workers; sir3 is the possible 
number of injured workers; and sir4 is the out-
age of the industrial building in consequence 
of the fire (days).
the likelihood irl  must be estimated from 
the following quantities:
the likelihood of ignition (initiating  –
event) E0, l0;
the conditional probability of alarm fail- –
ure, p1 = P(E1|E0); and
the conditional probabilities that sprin- –
klers ai will fail given E0 ∩ E1 or E0 ∩ 1E , 
namely, pi2 = P(Ei2|E0 ∩ E1) (figure 2).
the expression of the risk given by eq. (9) 
will be used to form the attribute vector 
= 1 2 3 4 5( , , , , )i i i i i ic c c c cc , in which ci1 to ci4 are 
expected significances treated later as random 
variables and ci5 will be the fixed (determinis-
tic) cost of ai (€mln) (the values of ci5 are given 
in table 1).
The fire E0 in a specific building is gener-
ally a rare and difficult-to-predict event and 
so are the failures of alarm and sprinklers, 
E1 and Ei2, given E0. therefore l0, p1, and pi2 
can be uncertain in the epistemic sense (e.g., 
Bradyberry and apostolakis, 1991). in the 
present example, the uncertainty in l0, p1, 
and pi2 is quantified by respective epistemic 
random variables L0, 1p , and  2ip  with the 
hypothetical probability distributions speci-
fied in Table 1 (the definition of the QRA term 
“epistemic uncertainty” is given, for instance, 
by aven, 2003).
the epistemic uncertainty in the likeli-
hoods irl  is modelled by the random variables 
irL  expressed through the epistemic random 
variables defined in Table 1:
= − − 1 0 1 2(1 )(1 )i iL L p p
= −  2 0 1 2(1 )i iL L p p
= − 3 0 1 2(1 )i iL L p p
=  4 0 1 2i iL L p p  (10)
components of the vectors sir  are assumed 
to be random variables and denoted by the 
symbols  1irs ,  2irs ,  3irs  and  4irs . they are 
grouped to a random vector irs  = (  1irs ,  2irs ,  3irs , 
 4irs ). The property loss due to fire,  1irs , obeys 
a lognormal distribution (rasbash et al., 2004). 
the parameters µir and σir of the random vari-
able µ σ 1 ~ ( , )ir ir irs L ( ir  σir) are given in table 2. the 
values of µir and σir were calculated by using 
mean values of  1irs  obtained from the statis-
tics of fires in industry (Ramachandran, 1998). 
Ignition Detection & alarm Extinguishing by  ai Outcome oir likelihoods
 E0, l0
E1,  p1
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figure 2. Simplified event tree diagram for a fire in a sprinklered building  
with a fire detection and alarm system
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values of standard deviations of  1irs  given in 
table 2 were assumed hypothetically.
the number of employees in the building 
under analysis is assumed to be fixed and 
equal to 20. the numbers of victims (fatalities 
and injuries), to the contrary, are modelled by 
random variables  2irs  and  3irs  which obey a 
binomial distribution, that is,  2irs ~B(20, ϕir2) 
and  3irs ~B(20, ϕir3), where ϕir2 and ϕir3 are 
binomial parameters used to specify prob-
abilities of individual numbers of victims. the 
binomial distributions are used to express the 
analyst’s uncertainty in the numbers of fire 
victims. values of ϕir2 and ϕir3 are given in ta-
ble 2. figure 3 illustrates the distribution of 
the random significance 123s ~B(20, ϕ123).
the durations of outage are also treated as 
random quantities and modelled by the ran-
dom variables  4irs . the analyst’s uncertainty 
in the outage duration is expressed by means 
of poisson distribution, namely,  4irs ~P(λir). 
values of λir related to individual alternatives 
and fire scenarios are given in Table 2. Fig-
ure 4 shows the probability mass function for 
the uncertain outage 114s ~P(λ14).













figure 3. probability mass function of the random 
number of injured persons, 123s  (sprinkler system 
a1, fire scenario r = 2); 123s ~B(20, 0.3)
table 2. Components of the random significance vectors sir*
*the probability distributions and their parameters presented in the table are hypothetical; L(∙), B(∙) and P(∙) 
denotes lognormal, binomial and poisson distribution, respectively
Table 2. Comp nents of the random significance vectors �sir * 
Dry pipe system a1 
Vectors �1s r  ( i = 1; r = 1, 2, 3 , 4) The mean µir and std. dev. σ ir of � 1irs  (€th) 
111s� : µ11 = 1.5, σ11 = 0.3 
121s� : µ12 = 5.3, σ12 = 1.325 
131s� : µ13 = 1.5, σ13 = 0.3 
(0.348, 0.198) 0 (20, 0.01) (2.0)
(1.637, 0.246) (20,0.10) (20,0.30) (17.0)
(0.348, 0.198) (20,0.05) (20,0.15) (2.0)
(1.778, 0.246) (20,0.25) (20,0.45) (19.0)
L B P
L B B P
L B B P








141s� : µ14 = 6.1, σ14 = 1.525 
Deluge system a2 
Vectors �2s r  ( i = 2; r = 1, 2, 3 , 4) The mean µir and std. dev. σir of � 1irs  (€th) 
211s� : µ21 = 3.3, σ21 = 0.66 
221s� : µ22 = 5.3, σ22 = 1.325 
�231s : µ23 = 3.3, σ23 = 0.66 
(1.013, 0.601) 0 (20, 0.01) (4.0)
(1.637, 0.246) (20,0.10) (20,0.30) (17.0)
(1.013, 0.601) 0 (20,0.05) (4.0)
(1.778, 0.246) (20,0.25) (20,0.45) (19.0)
L B P
L B B P
L B P








�241s : µ24 = 6.1, σ24 = 1.525 
Pre-action system a3 
Vectors �3s r  ( i = 3; r = 1, 2, 3 , 4) The mean µir and std. dev. σir of � 1irs  (€th) 
�311s : µ31 = 1.7, σ31 = 0.34 
�321s : µ32 = 5.3, σ32 = 1.325 
�331s : µ33 = 1.7, σ33 = 0.34 
(0.475, 0.331) 0 (20, 0.01) (2.0)
(1.637, 0.246) (20,0.10) (20,0.30) (17.0)
(0.475, 0.331) (20,0.05) (20,0.15) (2.0)
(1.778, 0.246) (20,0.25) (20,0.45) (19.0)
L B P
L B B P
L B B P














































































figure 4. probability mass function of the random 
duration of outage, 114s  (sprinkler system a1, fire 
scenario r = 1); 114s ~P(2.0)
with the random vectors irs  and the ran-
dom likelihoods irL , the attribute vector ci  
becomes a vector with four random and one 
fixed components:
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figure 5. scatter diagrams drawn for pairs of the simulated values 11,lc , 12,lc , 13,lc , and 14,lc  of the 
components of the random decision matrix C  (l = 1, 2, … , 10 000)
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the random components of ic  are expected 
significances.
the vectors ci  defined by Eq. (11) form a 
3×5 stochastic decision matrix =    t1 2 3[ , , ]C c c c . 
the selection of a* with C  is based on sam-
pling the matrices  lC .
components of ic  are functions of common 
random variables and so they are stochasti-
cally dependent, a practical implementation of 
sampling of  lC  is problematic. however, the 
components of ic  are represented by relatively 
simple eqs. (10) and (11), in which the random 
variables L0, 1p  and  2ip  as well as compo-
nents of irs  can be assumed to be independent. 
therefore the sampling from joint probability 
distributions of ic  can be replaced by a sim-
pler sampling from epistemic distributions of 
L0, 1p  and  2ip  as well as distributions of the 
components of the vectors irs  and calculating 
values of ic  by means of eqs. (10) and (11). 
results of such a sampling are illustrated for 
the vector 1c  in figure. 4 and 5.
for each sampled value  lC , a value of the 
normalized decision matrix lC  was calculated 
using the vector normalization formula:
−
=
= ∑ 2 1/21: /( )
m
ij ijl iji
NM c c c  (12)
where: ijlc  is the value of the random compo-
nent ijc  of C  sampled in the simulation step 
l. the Mas criteria K1 to K3 presented in ta-
ble 3 were applied to lC  with the weights:
w = (0.20, 0.30, 0.25, 0.10, 0.15)t (13)
the components of w mean that the great-
est significance was assigned to the attributes 
associated with the possible harm to people. 
the above weights have been chosen only as 
an example.
figure 6. histograms drawn for the simulated values 11,lc , 12,lc , 13,lc , and 14,lc  of the components  
of the random decision matrix C  (l = 1, 2, … , 10 000; the vertical axes in these graphs  
indicate the number of observations)
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a total of 1 ×104 simulation steps were 
carried out to propagate the epistemic uncer-
tainty in l0, p1, and pi2 and components of irs  
through the expressions (10) and (11) and then 
through the expressions of the criteria K1 to K3 
given in table 3 (Nl = 1×104).
in each step, K1 to K3 were used to find 
the best sprinklers a* on the basis of  lC . the 
simulation yielded the frequencies fri given in 
table 3. all three criteria K1 K2 and K3 sug-
gest a3 as a*.
results obtained in this example are de-
pendent on the vector normalization formula 
(12) used together with the criteria K1 to K3. 
an application of other normalization formula 
may lead to different results of Mas. there-
fore, results of Mas are conditioned on the use 
of specific normalization formula.
6. CoNClusioNs
The design of fire safety of buildings by 
applying formal means of multi-attribute se-
lection (Mas) has been considered. such a 
design requires to compare alternative solu-
tions of fire safety provisions in a building. In 
case where the choice of an optimal solution is 
carried out in line with the performance-based 
fire design, the attributes of an MAS problem 
must include measures of fire safety.
The prevailing approaches to fire safety as-
sessment today are fire risk indexing and es-
timation of fire risk used for quantitative risk 
assessment (qra). fire risk indices are popu-
lar and easy to implement systems of fire safe-
ty evaluation. however, their use within Mas 
is problematic, because the indices may be not 
sufficiently sensitive to differences among al-
ternative fire design solutions, for instance, 
alternative systems of automatic sprinklers. 
in addition, there exists large number of indi-
ces which are used in different countries and 
regions and are barely compatible with each 
other. the development of procedures used for 
the calculation of fire indices is not sufficiently 
documented and the calculation itself has a 
high degree of subjectivity.
An estimation of fire risk in line with QRA 
is carried out by applying much more rigorous 
procedures than those used for calculation of 
fire risk indices. Estimates of fire risk can be 
incorporated into a Mas problem by calculat-
ing expected severities related to individual 
outcomes (scenarios) of fire disaster. The fire 
risk can be related to alternative fire design 
solutions by estimating reliabilities (failure 
probabilities) of fire protection measures pro-
vided by individual designs.
the estimation of failure probabilities of 
fire protection measures in particular and fire 
risk in general can be a non-trivial task. the 
solution of it may require failure rate data and 
elicitation of expert opinions. However, the fire 
risk is a very comprehensive measure of fire 
safety and its estimation is worth of effort, es-
pecially if the fire design is carried out in line 
with the performance-based design codes.
the estimation of fire risk in line with 
qra may lead to the result that some or all 
elements of risk will be uncertain in the epis-
temic sense. an incorporation of probability 
distributions expressing the epistemic uncer-
tainty into an Mas problem will lead to a com-
position of a random decision matrix. the Mas 
problem with such a matrix can be solved by 
propagating the uncertainties through Mas 
models. this can be done by embedding these 
models into the loop of a Monte carlo simula-
tion. such a propagation is illustrated in the 
text by an example of a choice among alterna-
tive systems of fire sprinklers.
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saNtrauKa
Statybinio turto GaiSrinėS SauGoS užtikrinimaS: DauGiakriteriniS 
SprenDimų priėmimaS atSižveLGiant į GaiSro riziką
egidijus rytas VaiDogas, jurgita šakėnaitė
Norint užtikrinti pastatų gaisrinę saugą, gali prireikti lyginti alternatyvius projektinius saugos sprendimus. 
Tai atlikti galima pasitelkiant daugiakriterinio vertinimo metodologiją. Alternatyvieji sprendimai gali būti 
aprašyti keletu charakteristikų (atributų) ir lyginami vienas su kitu. Straipsnyje atributų sąrašas sudaromas 
naudojant gaisro rizikos išraišką, sudaromą kiekybinio rizikos vertinimo principais. Parodyta, kaip atlikti 
daugiakriterinį vertinimą, kai rizikos išraiškos elementai yra neapibrėžti epistemine prasme. Episteminio 
neapibrėžtumo skirstiniai priskiriami uždavinio atributams ir propaguojami matematiniais daugiakriterinio 
vertinimo modeliais pasitelkiant Monte Karlo modeliavimą. Pateikiamas pavyzdys, nagrinėjantis automati-
nių sprinklerių sistemos parinkimą iš kelių alternatyvių variantų.
